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Firm profitability is affected by location-specific factors such as agglomeration economies, 
infrastructure, or proximity to consumers or key producers. Location-specific profits are also 
influenced by the idiosyncratic match between the entrepreneur and the community. Using data 
on the universe of all new firm entrants in North Carolina and Iowa between 1992–2011, this 
study shows how observed location-specific factors affect the probability of new firm entry. We 
then show that the unobserved factors that influence new firm entry increase the probability of 
firm survival, demonstrating that these unobserved idiosyncratic factors influence firm 
profitability and are not just unproductive entrepreneurial preferences for the location.These 
unobserved factors are interpretable as match capital between the entrepreneur and the location. 
Shift-share analysis demonstrates that the match capital varies systematically across urban 
locations, meaning that the match capital can be incorporated into property values in densely 
populated markets. However, the match capital varies disproportionately within and not between 
rural markets, meaning that match capital in thin markets is primarily due to a unique match 
between the entrepreneur and the rural location. These results suggest that it will be easier to 
transfer firm profitability in the case of a firm sale in dense urban markets than in thin rural 
markets.  
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Introduction 
United States governments devote over $250 billion to luring new firms or incentivizing new 
firm entrants.1 However, new ventures are fragile.  One-third of new start-ups fail within two 
years of opening and two-thirds exit by their sixth year.2 As a result, at the time of entry, 
entrepreneurs must consider the salvage value of the venture were it to fail. Alternatively, exit 
may result from rising opportunity costs of the location that make sale of the capital more 
profitable than continuing with a going concern. Whether the government economic 
development policies succeed or fail depends on what factors influence firm entry decisions, how 
these factors contribute to the success or failure of new ventures, and how these factors vary 
across locations. 
  We investigate the role of location-specific human capital in firm entry decisions and 
firm survival rates using longitudinal data on all firms born in Iowa and North Carolina between 
1990 and 2011.  Previous research has focused on identifying market characteristics 
(agglomeration economics, wages, taxes, and local amenities) that influence firm location. 
However, the attributes of the firm and the entrepreneur may also have location-specific 
productivities that raise the firm’s profitability in one location compared to all the rest. This 
productivity may reflect the entrepreneur’s prior familiarity with the area, as suggested by the 
large number of entrepreneurs who start a business in their home town.3  It may also reflect the 
entrepreneur’s tastes for the home town, in which case the location choice may not be the profit-
maximizing location decision.  
                                                                
1 A 2012 New York Times article estimates that local governments spend $80.4 billion in business incentives each 
year, while state and federal sources contribute $170 billion. 
2 Based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics Business Employment Dynamics database. 
3 Shane (2008) reports that 48 percent of firms begin in the home or the garage. 
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This study presumes that entrepreneurs choose the location of their start-ups based not 
only upon the observed location characteristics typically considered in empirical work on site 
selection (markets, agglomeration economies, and factor costs) but also the unobservable 
idiosyncratic profitability of the site and the idiosyncratic complementarity between the 
entrepreneur’s skills and the location. These idiosyncratic components of the entry choice will be 
uncorrelated with the observable attributes of the local market, but they will be critical to the 
location choice relative to all other available location options. We interpret this idiosyncratic 
component as the match between the entrepreneur and the location. The match may represent the 
location-specific human capital of the entrepreneur, or it may represent the entrepreneur’s taste 
for living in a particular location. We will demonstrate that larger endowments of these 
idiosyncratic match components at the time of entry are systematically tied to the firm’s 
profitability and probability of survival, consistent with the location-specific human capital 
interpretation rather than the entrepreneur’s unproductive locational tastes. 
The idiosyncratic match affects the value of the firm as long as the entrepreneur remains 
involved with the venture, but that source of productivity ends if the firm is transferred to a new 
owner who lacks those same location-specific skills.  Therefore, the salvage value of the firm, 
the value of the firm were it to be sold, depends on the local supply of potential substitute 
entrepreneurs with like skills.4 In thin markets, the likelihood that there are similarly skilled 
entrepreneurs available is small, and so the salvage value of the firm in thin markets will be low 
relative to the present value of the stream of returns under the original management. As the 
market density increases, the probability of having like-skilled entrepreneurs in the local area 
rises, as does the salvage value of the firm relative to its present value under current 
                                                                
4 See Lazear (2009) for a similar argument. 
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management. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the match value of the firm is due 
primarily to the site-specific component in urban markets, but is due primarily to the 
idiosyncratic match between the entrepreneur and the site in rural markets. This finding is similar 
to the asset fixity literature used to explain why it is difficult to sell agricultural firms.5  
I. Literature review 
Firms are attracted by locations that promise streams of higher revenues or lower costs of 
generating sales.  Areas with higher factor costs due to high wages or taxes deter firm entry 
(Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). Firm entry rates are higher in urban than in rural areas in part 
because agglomeration economies in urban areas provide a marginal cost advantage over rural 
sites. A variety of agglomeration economies have been shown to raise productivity in dense 
markets—proximity to upstream input suppliers and downstream customers that lower 
transportation costs and improve information flow through the supply chain; concentrations of an 
educated workforce that hasten innovation and enhance the diffusion of new technologies; a 
ready supply of labor that lowers costs of labor turnover; a critical mass of similar firms that can 
share ideas and a larger specialized labor pool; and a diversity of firms that foster cross-
fertilization of ideas (Jofre-Monseny, Marín-López, and Viladecans-Marsal, 2011; Ellison, 
Glaeser, and Kerr, 2010; Shapiro, 2006; Moretti, 2004; Porter, 2003; Feldman and Audretch, 
1999; Glaeser et al., 1992).6 While the bulk of the research on agglomeration economies focuses 
on metropolitan areas, recent research by Artz, Kim, and Orazem (2016) finds that the same 
agglomeration factors matter for rural firm entry.  
 Agglomeration measures and other observable location characteristics such as tax rates, 
                                                                
5 See Barry and Robison (2001) for an early review of this literature. 
6 See Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and Manjón-Antolín (2010) for a comprehensive review of firm location 
empirical studies. 
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government expenditures, and natural amenities explain only a small fraction of the location 
choices of new firms. Proximity to home explains much more of the variation in firm location. 
For example, Figueiredo, Guimarães, and Woodward (2002) explain roughly 20 percent of 
variation in location choices of manufacturing firms in Portgual when they include only 
agglomeration measures. Adding an indicator of whether the location choice of the entrepreneur 
is the investor’s “home base” explains an additional 42 percent of the variation. They estimate 
that an entrepreneur is willing to pay more than three times the labor costs to remain in his home 
area. Similarly, Michelacci and Silva (2007) document that a significantly higher fraction of 
entrepreneurs work in the region where they were born relative to the corresponding fraction of 
workers.  
 The tendency to locate ventures in their place of birth may be merely a reflection of the 
entrepreneur’s tastes.  However, locating the venture in familiar territory may be a reflection of 
location-specific factors that raise the firm’s productivity.7  These factors may be unobserved 
location attributes that affect all firms at that location equally, or they may reflect location-
specific knowledge embodied in the entrepreneur  that uniquely raise the productivity only of 
that entrepreneur’s venture. For example, strong social ties may facilitate financing a start-up 
venture locally, help an entrepreneur attract and retain skilled labor, and may lead to increased 
community support for the business once opened (Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Besser and Miller, 
2013). Michelacci and Silva (2007) conclude that their advantage in accessing financing explains 
why local entrepreneurs are bigger, more capital-intensive, and better funded than firms created 
by non-local entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur’s location-specific capital may include knowledge 
                                                                
7
 This concept of specific local knowledge is akin to a concept from the migration literature that some returns to 
human capital are location specific. People make investments in their place of residence that increase the costs of 
migration. The accumulation of location-specific capital at a prior residence is positively associated with the 
probability of return migration (DaVanzo, 1983; Dierx, 1998).  
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of niche demands or resources that can be exploited in an area (Kirzner, 1997). Locational 
advantages could reflect an entrepreneur’s investments in skills pertinent to the industries in the 
place in which they reside (Krupka, 2009).8   
 If the location-specific productivity is due to the match between the entrepreneur and the 
location, it will be difficult to transfer that productive advantage to a successor. That suggests 
that when an entrepreneur who has significant location-specific capital attempts to pass the 
operation to another, the sale value will be substantially below the value if the entrepreneur were 
still involved. This is a variation on the asset fixity problem discussed most commonly in 
agricultural settings (Johnson, 1956; Edwards, 1959) or the spatial fixity problem analyzed by 
regional economists (Ward and Hite, 1999; Hite, 1997).   
Asset fixity has been used to explain why farmers faced with economic losses are slow to 
cut back on production (Johnson, 1956; Boetel, Hoffman, and Liu, 2007), or slow to exit the 
industry altogether (Foltz, 2004). The asset fixity trap arises when the salvage value of the farm 
deviates significantly from its use value under the current farmer and the asset becomes 
“trapped” in its current usage. The asset fixity problem has implications for entry. Thin salvage 
markets for fixed capital are an example of a sunk investment cost, which, in the presence of 
uncertain product demand, makes it less likely for farmers or other entrepreneurs to exit a market 
they are currently operating in, but also makes it less likely for firms to enter thin markets in the 
first place (Chavas, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1994). Since the salvage value will be lower in less 
densely populated markets, asset fixity will be more severe in rural than urban areas. This is 
consistent with the empirical evidence that rural firms live as long, or longer, than urban firms 
                                                                
8
 A broader notion allows development of human capital that is specific to a type of place, as opposed to any one 
particular place (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1982; Artz, 2003; Krupka, 2009).    
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(Buss and Lin, 1990; Huiban, 2011; Yu, Orazem, and Jolly, 2011).  
The decision to exit is a function of the difference between the expected present value of 
profit from operating the business and the potential sell-off value of the firm (Huiban, 2011). A 
higher salvage value increases the likelihood of a “successful closure,” exit to take advantage of 
another more profitable business or employment opportunity  (Wennberg and DiTienne, 2014; 
DiTienne, 2010). In urban markets, there is a higher probability of the existence of one or more 
potential successors with the same location-specific knowledge as the current owner. Hence, 
successful urban firms may have many suitors seeking to purchase them, and a higher probability 
of a successful exit. In contrast, successful rural firms will face a thin supply of both potential 
opportunities and potential successors.  Thus, as with Lazear’s (2009) skill-weights approach to 
human capital in which thicker markets make all skills general, the greater supply of potential 
successors in urban markets renders the firms’ assets more general and increases their sell-off 
value.  In rural areas, there are fewer potential entrepreneurs, making the firm’s productive assets 
more specific.9  
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section II lays out a model of firm location choice that 
incorporates idiosyncratic components that affect expected firm profitability across locations. We 
also incorporate the notion of salvage value as a function of market density.  Section III 
describes empirical specifications. Section IV describes our data and results. Section V concludes 
with a brief discussion of policy implications and future research. 
II. Model 
We require a model that will: (a) enable us to measure the relative importance of market factors 
                                                                
9
  Even productive assets that are tradable can become more or less specific if the market is very thin. Foltz (2004) 
provides the example of dairy cows in Connecticut:  because there are so few other dairies in the region, a farmer 
who wanted to exit might be forced to sell his dairy herd as cull cows rather than productive assets.  
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versus firm idiosyncratic factors in explaining where firms locate; (b) enable us to assess whether 
these idiosyncratic factors raise the entrepreneur’s profits or just the entrepreneur’s utility; (c) 
allow us to assess whether the idiosyncratic factor can be captured in the sale or salvage value of 
the firm; and, (d) identify how these factors differ between densely and sparsely populated 
markets. While these questions are ultimately empirical, our answers will only be as convincing 
as the tie between the theoretical measures and our empirical constructs. 
 Consider one of I entrepreneurs who has decided to open a business in year t in one of K 
sectors, but is deciding where the business will be located among J possible locations. We 
assume that the entrepreneur will make the decision based on the location that offers the highest 
present value of expected profit 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡, i=1,2,…, I; j = 1,2,…, J; k=1,2,…, K. Alternatively, we 
could define the problem as choosing the location that maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected 
discounted utility, 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡.  The reduced form of the firm location decision will be the same under 
both assumptions regarding the entrepreneur’s motivation, and so the focus on the profit 
motivation at this stage is for ease of presentation.  
II.A  The firm entry decision  
The firm’s expected discounted stream of profits conditional on success were it to open in year t 
in location j is given by  
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  Π(𝑍𝑗𝑡 , 𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑤, 𝑟,  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)         (1) 
 where 𝑍𝑗𝑡 are location-specific attributes that have been shown to influence firm entry in 
location j, 
 
Wkjt are sector-specific attributes in location j that have been shown to influence 
entry, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is a mixture of location-specific and firm-specific idiosyncratic profits from 
locating in city j that are unobservable to the econometrician but known to the entrepreneur. We 
assume that the firm is a price taker in the competitive output, labor, and land markets, and so 
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there is a common wage rate w and rental rate r across all markets that reflect the labor and 
capital types required for the firm’s production process.  
 Building on past studies, we define the vector of local agglomeration measures (𝑍𝑗𝑡) to 
include city size, industrial diversity, and the skill level of the population. City size has been 
commonly associated with agglomeration economies that raise productivity across sectors 
(Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Jane Jacobs (1969) argued that local areas with a broad mix of 
business were more attractive to new businesses. More educated populations improve firm 
productivity by enhancing the spillover of innovations and ideas across firms (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1986; Moretti, 2004). Consumers also benefit from local concentrations of customers 
with ability to pay, and so we include measures of median income per capita and of the county 
population. The counties in our sample are of roughly equal size, and so our population measure 
is interpretable as population density. 
 Past studies have also identified key sector-specific factors (𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡) that induce firm entry. 
Marshall (1920) and Porter (1990) have argued that firms are attracted to areas that have clusters 
of incumbent firms in the same sector, whether because proximity among similar firms aids in 
sharing customers or innovations or because firm clusters attract a better pool of workers with 
requisite sector-specific skills. Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010) and Moretti (2004) 
demonstrated the importance of nearby upstream input suppliers or downstream customers as 
aiding firm productivity and growth. 
 We specify the idiosyncratic component as  
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡         (2) 
These unobservables include the productive attributes of the entrepreneur, 𝜀𝑖, which are common 
across all areas, the productive potential of the location, 𝜀𝑗, which are common across all 
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ventures, the sector-specific location productivity, which are common across all firms in the 
sector, 𝜀𝑗𝑘, and a transitory random component, 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡. There is also an unobservable match 
component between the entrepreneur and the location, 𝜀𝑖𝑗. This match component could 
represent the entrepreneur’s taste for living in location j, in which case it will have no direct 
impact on the venture’s profitability, but will increase the likelihood that the firm opens in j. On 
the other hand, there may be an unobservable productive match between the entrepreneur and the 
location attributable to location-specific human capital that would raise the venture’s profitability 
in city j. We will not be able to distinguish whether 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is unobserved taste versus unobserved 
productivity at the time of entry, but we will be able to distinguish between the two hypotheses 
depending on how they are correlated with firm success. 
 Suppose that there are 𝑁𝑗 potential users of location j. The probability that entrepreneur i 
has the highest valued use of the location across all 𝑁𝑗 options at time t is 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗. That 
means that there is a probability (1 - 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗) that there is another entrepreneur who would 
value the site more highly. Over time, firm i will be getting random draws on 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 that will raise 
or lower its value. Bad draws on 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 will lower 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡, which will cause 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗 to fall and 
(1 - 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗) to rise.  
 Suppose that there is another entrepreneur ℓ who represents the best alternate operator of 
a firm at that same site.  If that entrepreneur were to take over, the present value of profits 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘𝑡 
would reflect the location-specific value of firm ℓ.  That value represents the highest amount that 
entrepreneur ℓ would be  willing to pay for the business assets and still make normal economic 
profit.10 
                                                                
10 For simplicity, we do not consider transaction costs of the transfer of ownership.  Transaction costs would add a 
fixed cost of entry, C,  so that the expected present value of profits for firm ℓ would be 𝜋′ℓ𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝐶.    
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 Combining these two possibilities that the firm survives or dies, firm i’s expected value at 
time t is 
 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘𝑡     (3) 
Equation (3) demonstrates that as market density increases, the idiosyncratic source of the firm’s 
value 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 gets smaller and the location-specific value (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘𝑡 
rises. In thick markets, the new entrant can expect to capture much of its value even if it closes 
by selling its assets to a successor. The reason is that as Nj rises, the number of potential 
successors that could match or exceed the value of the firm as managed by entrepreneur i 
increases and the assets of the business become more general. In thin markets, there may be no 
successor that could generate the same value as i, even if entrepreneur i faces some bad draws on 
𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡. 
II.B  Location-specific matches will be most important in thin markets 
At the time of entry, it must be true that  
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘0 =  𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘0 ≥ 𝑉𝑖𝑗′𝑘0∀𝑗′ ≠ 𝑗  (4A) 
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘0 =  𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘0 ≥ 𝑉ℓ𝑗𝑘0∀ℓ ≠ 𝑖  (4B) 
 
which means that individual i expects at least as much value at location j at time 0 as at any other 
location and that no other potential entrant values location j more highly at time 0 than does 
individual i. The location-specific attributes 𝑍𝑗0 and  𝑊𝑘𝑗0 will be common across all potential 
entrants. In addition, the expected contribution from the location-specific value that can be 
captured through resale of the venture, (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗𝑘0, will also be common across all 
potential entrants. As a result, condition (4B) implies that in any area j, the successful entrant 
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will have the largest idiosyncratic component, 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡. However, for (4A) to hold, this 
idiosyncratic component has to be larger in thin markets than in thick markets to overcome the 
relatively large location-specific values in thicker markets. As a result, at the margin, 
idiosyncratic components will be largest in the thinnest markets.  
 The components of (2) that will prove most important for satisfying (4A) and (4B) are 𝜀𝑖, 
𝜀𝑖𝑗, and 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘0. The first component is the entrepreneur’s skill that raises value across all markets. 
Individuals for whom 𝜀𝑖 ≥ 𝜀𝑖′  ∀𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖 will be able to locate in areas with the largest location-
specific values, and so the best entrepreneurs will congregate atypically in thick markets.11   
 To locate in a thin market, an entrepreneur has to make up for the low location-specific 
value compared to a thick market. That requires a large draw on the location-specific match, 
which is made up of 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘0, and so thin market entrepreneurs will atypically have large 
transitory or permanent values of the location-specific match. 
III. Empirical specification 
Our empirical work uses data on a firm’s choice of location j from all J possible locations, and so 
we work from equation 4A).  Equation 4B) would require that we have information on all 
possible firms that could have selected location j, information that is not plausibly available as it 
would include possible ventures that never opened.  We begin by noting that in equation 4A), 
𝑉𝑖𝑗′𝑘0 = 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0 + (1 − 𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗) ∙ 𝜋ℓ𝑗′𝑘0 = 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0  because location j’  is defined 
as the best alternative location to  j.  As a result, 4A) can be rewritten as  
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘0 =  𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ (𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0) + 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0 ≥ 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0 ;  
so that 
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘0 ≥ 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝐺(𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘0)
𝑁𝑗 ∙ (𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0) ≥ 0  
                                                                
11 This point was emphasized in Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014).  
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𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘0 ≥ 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓  (𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗′𝑘0) ≥ 0  
so that at the time of firm i’s entry into market j, the present value of firm profit at that time and 
location dominates the present value of that firm’s profit at that time and any other location. The 
linear approximation to the reduced-form present value of firm i in industry k, location j and year 
t given by: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 ≡ 𝑍𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑍 + 𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑊 + 𝛼𝑝𝑖𝑝 +  𝛼𝑤𝑖𝑤 + 𝛼𝑟𝑖𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖 +  𝜀𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡      (5) 
 
where 𝛾𝑍 and 𝛾𝑊 are vectors of coefficients. The parameters 𝛼𝑝𝑖, 𝛼𝑤𝑖 and 𝛼𝑟𝑖 translate prices, 
wages, and capital rental rates into profit equivalents in a manner common across all locations, 
given firm i’s production process. The firm will choose location j so that it maximizes expected 
value compared to all other possible locations, j’. We can characterize that decision using a 
dichotomous variable 𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1 if the firm opts to enter area j in year t and 𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 0 otherwise, 
implying that 𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1 if 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑗′𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑗′ ≠ 𝑗.  
Using the linearized profit (5), we have  
𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓  (𝑍𝑗𝑡
′ −  𝑍𝑗′𝑡
′ )𝛾𝑍 + (𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡
′ −  𝑊𝑘𝑗′𝑡
′ )𝛾𝑊 >  𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜁𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡∀ 𝑗
′ ≠ 𝑗  (6) 
where  𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑘 = (𝜀𝑗′ + 𝜀𝑗′𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗′) − (𝜀𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗) and 𝜁𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 ≡ 𝜔𝑖𝑘𝑗′𝑡 − 𝜔𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡. Note that the 
common firm effects 𝛼𝑝𝑖𝑝 +  𝛼𝑤𝑖𝑤 + 𝛼𝑟𝑖𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖 are differenced away because they represent a 
common level of firm profits across markets and so do not affect relative profitability across 
locations. If we assume that the composite error term 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜁𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 follows the type-1 extreme 
distribution, we can estimate (6) using the conditional logit estimator.  
III.A. Identifying whether the idiosyncratic location match component is unobserved taste or 
profit 
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The parameters will allow us to estimate the probability of firm entry in all J possible locations. 
In particular, the predicted probability of firm entry into location J*, the location actually chosen, 
conditional on the observable factors is   F[𝑍𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂?], where F[·] is the cumulative 
distribution and 𝛾?̂? and 𝛾?̂? are the parameters from estimating (6). The predicted probability will 
not equal 1 because of the unobserved factors that influence the firm location decision. By 
construction, the observed outcome is  F[𝑍𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂? +  𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘] = 1,  where the difference 
between the ex ante predicted probability of the location J* and the realized outcome ex post  is 
due to the unobservable 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 = (𝜀𝐽∗ + 𝜀𝐽∗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝐽∗ + 𝜔𝑖𝑘𝑗∗). The idiosyncratic match between 
the entrepreneur and the location can be measured by the monotonic transformation of the error 
terms,  
ℎ(𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘) = 1- F[𝑍𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗𝑡
′ 𝛾?̂?].        (7) 
 If these unobserved factors affecting new firm location are productive assets that raise 
firm profitability, they should affect the probability of firm survival.  If they are just reflective of 
the entrepreneur’s taste for the location, they will not affect firm productivity.   To investigate 
this question, we embed our measure of these unobserved factors into the firm’s realized value of 
profit as of time 𝜏   
𝜋𝑖𝐽∗𝑘𝜏
𝑅 = 𝑍𝐽∗0
′ 𝛽𝑍
𝑖 + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗0
′ 𝛽𝑊
𝑖 + 𝛽𝜑ℎ(𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘) + 𝜃𝑖𝐽∗𝑘𝜏         (8) 
where the first three terms on the right-hand side represent the profit expected at the time of 
start-up and 𝜃𝑖𝐽∗𝑘𝜏 denotes a random negative or positive shock to the expected stream of returns 
to entrepreneurship that is realized as of time 𝜏. The firm will remain in business provided 
𝜋𝑖𝐽∗𝑘𝜏
𝑅 > 𝜋ℓ𝐽∗𝑘𝜏 where ℓ is the most profitable potential successor at location j.  Let 𝑇𝑖 > 0 
denote the duration of the firm’s existence. If an entrepreneur i exits business 𝜏𝑖 years after start-
up, then 𝑇𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖. Ti has a cumulative distribution, 𝐻(𝜏𝑖), which is the probability of firm failure 
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by time 𝜏𝑖. The associated probability density function is ℎ(𝜏𝑖).  
The probability of failure at time 𝑡 + 𝜏 is: 
𝐻(𝜏𝑖) = Pr (𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑖)  
 = Pr (𝑍𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑍
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑍
ℓ) + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑊
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑊
ℓ ) + 𝛽𝜑ℎ(𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘) + (𝜃𝑖𝐽∗𝑘,𝜏 −  𝜀ℓ𝐽∗𝑘𝜏) ≤ 0) 
 = Pr ((𝜃𝑖𝐽∗𝑘𝜏 − 𝜀ℓ𝐽∗𝑘𝜏) ≤ −(𝑍𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑍
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑍
ℓ) + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑊
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑊
ℓ ) + 𝛽𝜑ℎ(𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘)) 
 = 𝐻[−(𝑍𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑍
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑍
ℓ) + 𝑊𝑘𝐽∗0
′ (𝛽𝑊
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑊
ℓ ) + 𝛽𝜑ℎ(𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘))]    (9) 
The coefficient 𝛽𝜑 relates the unobserved component to firm profit. If it is positive, then large 
values of 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 will increase firm profits and lower the probability of firm exit. However, if 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 
is just the entrepreneur’s taste for location J*, then it will increase the likelihood of entry, but it 
will have no implications for firm profit or survival, and we will find that 𝛽𝜑=0. In addition, an 
atypically productive draw that makes local market attributes more profitable for a potential 
successor than the incumbent ((𝛽𝑍
𝑖 < 𝛽𝑍
ℓ)or (𝛽𝑊
𝑖 < 𝛽𝑊
ℓ )); or if a successor entrepreneur has an 
atypically large draw on ability,  𝜀ℓ;  or if the location match, 𝜀ℓ𝐽∗ is unusually large.  
Consequently, the existence of a more profitable potential successor will also increase the 
probability of exit, even if the incumbent entrepreneur is making money.   
III.B  Can the idiosyncratic location match component be incorporated into the sale value or 
salvage value of the firm? 
If the unobserved component is large due to location-specific factors 𝜀𝐽∗ + 𝜀𝐽∗𝑘, then it will be a 
common unobserved effect across all ventures rather than being tied to this particular venture. 
These unobserved attributes are common across venture i and its potential successors. As a 
result, its productivity can be transferred from the present entrepreneur to the successor, and so 
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the value of 𝜀𝐽∗ + 𝜀𝐽∗𝑘 will be included in the resale price. However, if the unobserved 
component is mainly due to the idiosyncratic match between the entrepreneur and the location, 
𝜀𝑖𝐽∗ +  𝜔𝑖𝑘𝑗∗, the firm’s value depends on the participation of entrepreneur i and so the value of 
the venture to a successor will be much lower. As demonstrated by equation (3), the unobserved 
source of value for firm i will depend increasingly on common location-specific factors as Nj 
increases.  
 We can immediately assess the fraction of 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 that is location-specific by regressing 
𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 on a complete set of location-specific dummy variables,  
𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 =  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝐽∗ ,        (10) 
where the first term is a series of dummy variables where 𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1 when j=J* and 0 otherwise. 
Equation (10) is equivalent to an analysis of variance of the idiosyncratic component. The first 
term is the ‘between’ component that will give us the share of the variance of the idiosyncratic 
component due to location-specific factors. The between component will capture all of the 
variation in 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 that varies systematically across markets and can therefore be priced at time of 
sale or salvage of the firm. The second term, the ‘within’ component, will reflect the match-
specific capital reflecting the unique profitability of the union of the entrepreneur with the 
location. Because this profit is lost when the current entrepreneur is no longer involved with the 
firm, it cannot be priced upon sale or salvage.  Because Nj is larger in dense urban areas, we 
would expect that the first term would dominate in urban markets and the second term would be 
more important in thin rural markets. As demonstrated by conditions (4A) and (4B), the large 
idiosyncratic value in thin markets will be driven by a large draw on the match between the 
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entrepreneur and the location, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘0.
12   
IV.  Data 
 
Our data include the universe of all firms that opened for business between 1991–2011 in North 
Carolina and Iowa. The states were selected because they both have a broad continuum of county 
populations from remote rural small towns to metropolitan areas. The data come from the 
National Establishment Time Series (NETS) Dataset. Our sample consists of 283,721 new firm 
entrants in Iowa and 889,533 new firms in North Carolina. To fit the spirit of the model, we 
restrict our sample to for-profit firms. We exclude non-profit organizations, government 
agencies, and public service firms such as museums or historical sites. We also exclude 
agricultural and mining firms because they are not free to choose any location but must pick sites 
with requisite land, mineral, and water resources. 
 Each new entrant chooses one of the 99 counties in Iowa or one of the 100 counties in 
North Carolina. We use the 1993 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC) to divide the counties 
into urban and rural designations at the start of our sample period. Urban counties have an 
RUCC between 0 and 5 and rural counties have an RUCC between 6 and 9. The sample is large 
enough to insure we will have adequate representation in all markets. In Iowa, 170,548 (60 
percent) of the start-ups entered urban markets and 113,173 (40 percent) entered rural markets. 
In North Carolina, 724,912 (81 percent) are urban and 164,621(19 percent) are rural.  
To estimate equation (6), we need measures of location-specific attributes 𝑍𝑗𝑡 and 
location-sector-specific attributes 𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡.  Our location-specific factors include the rural-urban 
designator plus measures of the industrial diversity and labor force skill in each county. 
                                                                
12
 We might expect that only the permanent locational match component 𝜀𝑖𝑗 would predict firm survival; however, a 
large, positive, but transitory, profit shock at time of entry could affect the likelihood that the firm survives the first 
few years.  
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Industrial diversity is characterized by Concentrationjt, measured as ∑ 𝑆𝑘𝑗𝑡
2120
𝑘=1 , the sum of the 
squared employment shares across 120 four-digit NAICS industries. We base our employment 
shares on sectoral wage bills from the Quarterly Census of Employment published by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics over the 1990–2010 period. This variant of the Herfindahl- Hirschman 
Concentration Index will range from 0 to 1 and will be inversely related to sectoral diversity in 
each county.  
Our measure of local skill is College%jt, the percentage of county residents over age 25 
with at least some college education. The data were culled from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census 
of Population and the 2005–2009 American Community Survey. The same source provided 
information on county Populationjt and median per capita Incomejt . 
Our elements of the vector of sectoral market factors include Clusterjkt, the proportion of 
all establishments in industry k in the state that are located in county j. This measure, known as a 
location quotient, was computed by aggregating across all incumbent firms in the NETS data 
using: 
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑡 = (
𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑗𝑡
) / (
𝑁𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 
where 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡 denotes the number of incumbent establishments in county j , industry k, and year t; 
𝑁𝑗𝑡 denotes the number of total incumbent establishments in county j; 𝑁𝑘𝑡 denotes the number of 
incumbents in industry k in the state; and 𝑁𝑡 denotes the number of all establishments in the 
state. This measure will indicate whether county j has an atypical concentration in sector k. 
The access to upstream suppliers (Upstreamjkt) and downstream customers 
(Downstreamjkt) for sector k was constructed using input-output tables. Using the 1997 and 2002 
Standard Use Tables form the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we measure the share-weighted 
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concentration of sector k suppliers and customers in county j. The access to upstream firms is 
measured by: 
𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑗𝑘𝑡 = ∑
𝑁𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑁𝑠𝑡
∙
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠→𝑘
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
∙ 100𝑠    ∀𝑠 ≠ 𝑘 
where 𝑁𝑠𝑗𝑡 denotes the number of incumbent establishments in industry s and county j; 𝑁𝑠𝑡 
denotes the number of establishments in industry s in the state, and  
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠→𝑘
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
  is the proportion of 
all input purchases made by firms in industry k from industry s from the input-output matrix. 
Similarly, local access to downstream firms is: 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑗𝑘𝑡 = ∑
𝑁𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑁𝑠𝑡
∙
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘→𝑠
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
∙ 100𝑠    ∀𝑠 ≠ 𝑘 
where 𝑁𝑠𝑗𝑡 and 𝑁𝑠𝑡 are defined as before and  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘→𝑠
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘
  is the portion of all sales made by firms 
in industry k to industry s from the input-output matrix.  
Table 1 summarizes the data used to test the model. We report the sample statistics 
separately for the two states and by urban and rural areas. The values are quite consistent across 
states, however, they illustrate large differences in market attributes between rural and urban 
areas. Urban areas have larger clusters of incumbent firms in each sector, have much better 
access to upstream suppliers and downstream customers, have higher concentrations of educated 
workers, and have more diverse mix of firms across sectors.  
The firm-specific attributes are also reported in Table 1. New entrants are 
disproportionately small with about 90 percent having fewer than six employees at birth. Less 
than 10 percent are branch expansions of parent firms. The size and stand-alone attributes of 
start-ups are comparable across states and across urban and rural markets, and so any differences 
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in firm entry patterns or success across urban and rural markets will not be driven by firm size at 
entry or firm access to deep pocketed parent companies.  
V.  Results 
We report the results of estimating equation (6) in Table 2. We estimate two versions of the 
model, with and without Populationjt  and the Ruraljt indicator.
13 The estimation shows how 
location-specific attributes alter the probability that each new entrant chooses that location 
compared to all other locations in the state. All attributes of the entrepreneur such as age, 
education, marital status, and prior entrepreneurial experience are common across locations and 
do not affect the location choice except as they are correlated with unobserved firm attributes. 
These will be captured in the error terms as we will discuss below. All firm attributes such as 
initial firm size, sector, financing, and status as a branch or stand-alone entrant are also common 
across all locations and are therefore held constant across locations. We therefore focus on the 
location-specific factors, 𝑍𝑗𝑡 , and location-sector-specific attributes, 𝑊𝑘𝑗𝑡, which vary across 
markets.  
 The results show that market attributes have significant effects on locational choice. The 
results are very consistent across states. Having a presence of incumbent firms in the same four-
digit industry in the county attracts new entrants. Having more upstream suppliers to and 
downstream customers of the sector in close proximity adds to the attractiveness of a local 
market, although these effects are much smaller when we include population in the estimation. 
Locations with higher concentrations of college-educated workers and a more diversified (i.e., 
                                                                
13
 We estimated equation (4) including a dummy variable indicating that the county was rural and excluding the 
population measure. It turned out that the rural designation and the measure of local employment concentration are 
highly correlated. As a result, the concentration measure changes sign when the rural dummy is included, although 
no other coefficients are affected. The model performed similarly when we include either the rural dummy variable 
or the employment concentration measure.  
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less concentrated) economy are more promising hosts for start-ups. However, even when we 
control for these other measures, firms are less likely to enter rural counties, consistent with the 
presumed smaller location-specific value in (3) in thinner markets. 
 We convert these coefficients into elasticities in Tables 3A and 3B and report the implied 
values separately for urban and rural markets. As a rule, locational attributes have comparably 
sized elasticities across urban and rural markets, but the sectoral elasticities are larger in urban 
markets. Firms locating in rural markets are virtually unaffected by the presence of upstream or 
downstream firms, presumably because they already have a business plan that does not depend 
on nearby suppliers or customers. Rural entrants are also less influenced than urban entrants by 
local clusters of firms in the same sector in Iowa, although the urban-rural differences in the 
magnitude of the cluster elasticity are more modest.  
 We generate a monotonically increasing measure of the idiosyncratic match error term, 
𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘, using equation (7). We illustrate the distribution of these idiosyncratic components in 
Figures 1A and 1B. Recall that 0 ≤ 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 ≤ 1. The patterns in Iowa and North Carolina are very 
similar. It is immediately apparent that the idiosyncratic match component represents the 
disproportionate share of the reason firms choose a location. Over 90 percent of new market 
entrants have match components exceeding 0.9. Because the rural cumulative distribution lies to 
the right of the urban CDF, we can conclude that the idiosyncratic locational match component is 
more important in rural than in urban markets.  
It is possible that the idiosyncratic match is based on tastes. For example, entrepreneurs 
may choose locations based on where they want to live and not where the firm is likely to 
succeed. To investigate that question, we embed our measure of the idiosyncratic match into the 
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survivor function (9). The outcomes are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The match component is 
significantly tied to firm survival, consistent with the presumption that it represents an 
unobserved productive match between the entrepreneur and the location. This is true even after 
we control for firm size and whether the firm is part of a multi-establishment firm. The effect 
remains strong although it shrinks in size when we add a control for rural county.  
We can further illustrate the importance of the idiosyncratic match by plotting the implied 
hazard of firm exit by length of time since firm birth. The higher match value for rural firms 
means that rural firms live longer holding observed profit factors constant, a finding consistent 
with results reported by Yu et al. (2011). In both North Carolina and Iowa, the hazard function 
for urban start-ups lies to the left of the rural start-ups, indicating a shorter expected length of life 
for urban firms at the time of firm birth.  
This idiosyncratic match could be due to location-specific profitability or to attributes of 
the entrepreneur that are complementary with location. If the match profitability is due to 
location, then the entrepreneur can add that component to the sale price of the firm. If the 
idiosyncratic component is tied to the presence of the current entrepreneur, then it cannot be 
priced upon resale. We investigate this question using equation (10). The results are reported in 
Table 6. In both Iowa and North Carolina, the match capital for rural ventures is atypically tied to 
the match between the current entrepreneur and the location. The location-specific component 
represents 32 percent of the urban match variation but only 17 percent of the rural match 
variation in Iowa. In North Carolina, the location-specific component represents 60 percent of 
the urban match variation but just 36 percent of the rural match variation. Once we control for 
population, over 90 percent of the variation in the urban match is explained by the county-fixed 
factors in urban markets, but in rural areas, over 90 percent is tied to the match between the 
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location and the entrepreneur. The greater capitalization of the idiosyncratic match in urban 
markets could be due to a larger number of potential successor entrepreneurs with the same 
location-specific match or it may be unobserved location-specific profitability common across all 
firms in the sector.  
VI. Conclusion 
A large data set of new firm entrants over the 1991–2011 period demonstrates that location-
specific and location-sector-specific factors consistently attract start-ups to locations with a 
larger number of incumbent firms in the same sector, with larger numbers of firms in sectors that 
buy from or sell to the same sector, with more educated potential workers, and with a more 
diverse mix of firms. Nevertheless, the entry decision is driven more by idiosyncratic factors 
than by observable market factors. These idiosyncratic factors are productive and not just the 
entrepreneur’s taste for the location, and so start-ups with large idiosyncratic match components 
live longer. At least some of this match is due to unique complementary relationships between 
the entrepreneur and the location, a source of profitability that cannot be transferred to 
successors. As a result, some elements of the firm cannot be priced at the time the firm is sold 
and cannot be included in the salvage value of the firm were it to fail. This unique match 
component between the current entrepreneur and the location is of particular importance in thinly 
populated markets, and so rural firms will face a lower resale value than urban firms with the 
same current profit stream.  
This result demonstrates the Lazear (2009) proposition that population density changes 
the specificity of human capital.  In his case, workers are searching for firms.  In ours, 
entrepreneurs are searching for locations.  Entrepreneurial skills appear to be a location-specific 
productive factor in dense markets.  In thin markets, entrepreneurial skills are idiosyncratic and 
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tied to the match between the entrepreneur and the location.   
Because most ventures fail, forward looking entrepreneurs must factor in the possible 
salvage value of the venture at exit.  In thick, urban markets, there is a high probability of finding 
someone else in that market who shares the same skill set and so the salvage value of the firm is 
independent of the current entrepreneur.  In thin, rural markets, the firm value is idiosyncratically 
tied to the current entrepreneur and that value will not be captured by the salvage value of the 
firm.   The data are consistent with the model’s predictions that both entry and exit rates are 
higher in thicker markets.   
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Table 1. Sample Statistics of the Iowa and North Carolina Start-ups, 1991–2011 
 Iowa North Carolina 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Local Attributes:     
Clusterjkt: Location quotient  
0.771 0.565 0.984 0.970 
(0.595) (0.510) (0.339) (0.526) 
Upstreamjkt:  Relative number of upstream suppliers in 
county j compared to the state average for the sector 
0.629 0.109 0.323 0.060 
(0.908) (0.097) (0.636) (0.087) 
Downstreamjkt: Relative number of downstream 
customers in county j compared to the state average for 
the sector 
0.713 0.104 0.484 0.077 
(1.261) (0.105) (0.931) (0.094) 
College%jt: Percentage of the county population aged 
25 and over with at least some college education 
0.498 0.401 0.494 0.383 
(0.202) (0.149) (0.223) (0.182) 
Concentrationjt: Sum of squared employment shares 
across all sectors in the county   
0.183 0.214 0.168 0.193 
(0.080) (0.101) (0.083) (0.106) 
Incomejt: (Median household income in thousands of 
1990 dollars) 
 
24.127 21.562 23.042 19.341 
(2.865) (2.087) (3.406) (2.471) 
Populationjt: (in thousands) 90.431 14.608 139.395 32.201 
(81.32) (6.24) (135.85) (20.30) 
Firm Attributes:     
Small Entrant:  Proportion of all entering firms ≤ 5 
employees.  
0.852 0.891 0.914 0.927 
(0.355) (0.311) (0.281) (0.286) 
Medium Entrant: Proportion of all entering firms > 5 
but ≤ 50 employees. 
0.132 0.101 0.077 0.055 
(0.338) (0.301) (0.267) (0.249) 
Large Entrant: Proportion of all entering firms >50 
employees.  
0.016 0.008 0.009 0.007 
(0.126) (0.089) (0.094) (0.082) 
Branch : Establishment is part of a multi-establishment 
firm 
0.099 0.073 0.075 0.064 
(0.299) (0.260) (0.263) (0.245) 
Number of Firms 170,548 113,173 724,912 164,621 
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Table 2. Conditional Logit Estimation for the Firm Entry Location Decision, Iowa and North 
Carolina, 1991–2011 
 Iowa North Carolina 
 (A) (B) (A) (B) 
Clusterjkt: 0.343*** 0.404*** 0.262*** 0.223*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Upstreamjkt: 0.032*** 0.251*** 0.001 0.089*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Downstreamjkt:  0.017*** 0.161*** 0.036*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
College%jt:  1.165*** 4.225*** 3.450*** 4.429*** 
 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) 
Concentrationjt:  -0.999*** -1.083*** -0.439*** -0.240*** 
 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.025) (0.024) 
MedianHouseholdIncomejt: 0.039*** 0.105*** 0.005*** 0.102*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) 
Populationjt: 5.595***  2.723*** 
 
 
(0.032)  (0.010)  
Ruraljt: -0.813***  -0.851*** 
 
 (0.006)  (0.003)  
     
Log likelihood -964457.43 -960998.69 -2851072.3 -2770753.8 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3A. Elasticities of Local Attributes in North Carolina and Iowa on Firm Entry 
 Iowa  North Carolina 
 Urban Rural  Urban Rural 
Clusterjkt:  0.360 0.206  0.299 0.300 
Upstreamjkt: 0.062 0.004  0.001 <0.001 
Downstreamjkt:  0.037 0.002  0.065 0.004 
College%jt:  0.666 0.488  2.163 1.584 
Concentrationjt:  -0.222 -0.237  -0.089 -0.097 
MedianHouseholdIncomejt: 1.049 0.851  0.130 0.095 
Populationjt: 1.180 0.095  1.140 0.134 
Note: Elasticities correspond to the application of the specification in Table 2 including population but applied 
separately to urban and rural markets. 
 
 
Table 3B. Elasticities of Local Attributes in North Carolina and Iowa on Firm Entry 
 Iowa  North Carolina 
 Urban Rural  Urban Rural 
Clusterjkt:  0.424 0.243  0.252 0.246 
Upstreamjkt: 0.478 0.031  0.099 0.009 
Downstreamjkt:  0.352 0.020  0.322 0.022 
College%jt:  2.642 1.936  2.735 2.042 
Concentrationjt:  -0.241 -0.259  -0.048 -0.053  
MedianHouseholdIncomejt: 2.839 2.303  2.740 2.022 
Note: Elasticities correspond to the application of the specification in Table 2, column B applied separately to urban 
and rural markets. 
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Table 4. Estimated Survival Function for New Market Entrants over the 1991–2010 Period as of 
2011. 
Dependent variable:  Iowa North Carolina 
log(survival time) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
     
Match: 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘 0.968*** 0.676*** 0.437*** 0.463*** 
(0.048) (0.041) (0.028) (0.027) 
Medium Entrant  0.237*** 0.235*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
Large Entrant   0.096*** 0.091*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.017) (0.017) 
Branch 0.338*** 0.342*** 0.215*** 0.220*** 
(0.011) (0.039) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
 
 
  
Log likelihood -233290.59 -233353.2 -700912.46 -700887.61 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% .  Standard errors generated by bootstrapping 
the data 100 times with replacement and sequentially applying equations (6) and (9).  Column A also includes 
controls for population and rural county designation.
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Table 5. Elasticities of the Attributes for the Survival Function for New Market Entrants over the 
1992–2010 period as of 2011 
Dependent variable:  Iowa North Carolina 
log(survival time) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
     
Match 0.925 0.650 0.414 0.442 
Medium Entrant  0.021 0.021 0.033 0.033 
Large Entrant   0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
Branch 0.032 0.034 0.019 0.019 
Note: Elasticities correspond to the estimates reported in Table 4  
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Table 6A. Variance Decomposition of the Idiosyncratic Match into between (Location-Specific) 
and within (Entrepreneur-Location Match) Components, without Population included in 
Estimation 
 Iowa North Carolina 
Variance due to  Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Between: 𝜀𝐽∗ + 𝜀𝐽∗𝑘
 0.36 0.18 0.78 0.55 
Within: 𝜀𝑖𝐽∗
 0.64 0.82 0.22 0.45 
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
Table 6B. Variance Decomposition of the Idiosyncratic Match into between (Location-Specific) 
and within (Entrepreneur-Location Match) Components, with Population included in Estimation 
 Iowa North Carolina 
Variance due to  Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Between: 𝜀𝐽∗ + 𝜀𝐽∗𝑘
 0.90 0.04 0.93 0.10 
Within: 𝜀𝑖𝐽∗
 0.10 0.96 0.07 0.90 
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
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Figure 1.  Cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic match between entrepreneur 
and location, 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘(based on parameters estimated in column A of Table 4) 
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Figure 2.  Cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic match between entrepreneur 
and location, 𝜑𝑖𝐽∗𝑘(based on parameters estimated in column B of Table 4) 
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Figure 3. Predicted hazard of firm exit based on parameters estimated in column A of Table 4.  
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Figure 4.  Predicted hazard of firm exit based on parameters estimated in column B of Table 4.  
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